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THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT.
On August 28th of last year the Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws meeting in Chicago adopted a
limited partnership act and recommended it to the legislatures
of the several states. The first state to adopt the act is Pennsyl-
vania, the act becoming part of the law of the state on April 12th.
The committee of the Conference charged with the duty of
preparing the tentative drafts for submission to the Conference
was the Committee on Commercial Law, the same committee
which has been responsible for the acts on negotiable instruments,
bills of lading, warehouse receipts, sales of goods, and partner-
ship. The writer, acting for the New York Drafting Associa-
tion, served the Commercial Law Committee in the capacity of
draftsman; that is, he was responsible for placing before the
Committee the successive tentative drafts. But, as in the case
of all other commercial acts recently issued by the Conference,
the two successive drafts of this limited partnership act sub-
mitted to the Conference were the joint work of the Commercial
Law Committee and the draftsman, every sentence being ham-
mered out by round table discussions. The Conference itself,
composed as it is of lawyers appointed by the governors of the
several states, devoted many hours of the 1915 and 1916 sessions
to a full discussion of the general principles on which the act is
based, and to the wording of each section.
(715)
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The term "limited partnership" is sometimes employed to
denote an association for carrying on business with a view to
profit, in which, as in a corporation, the- liability of all the mem-
bers is limited to their contributions to the common fund, or to
some multiple of such contributions, but in which the other legal
incidents are not identical with those of an association organized
under the general incorporation law of the state. These associa-
tions are not partnerships and are incorrectly designated as "lim-
ited partnerships." A true limited partnership is an association
in which the liability of one or more but not all of the members
is limited to their contributions to the common fund; the liability
of the other member or members for the debts of the association
being unlimited. The members whose liability is limited are
usually referred to as "limited" or "special partners," while those
whose liability is unlimited are referred to as "general partners."
The first limited partnership act in the United States was
that adopted by the State of New York in 1822;- the other com-
mercial states during the ensuing thirty years followed her ex-
ample, until today all the states, except New Mexico, have
such an act. The various statutes follow the language of the
New York statute with little material variation. The New York
act was modeled on the Socijtg en Comnmandite of the French
Commercial Code. The Surrogate, Alexander W. Bradford,
speaking in 185o, of the New York statute, in his opinion in
Ames v. Downing,1 gives an account of the origin of this French
business association. He says:
"The system of limited partnerships, which was introduced by
statute into this state, and subsequently very generally adopted in
many other states of the. Union, was borrowed from the French
Code. 3 Kent, 36; Code de Commerce. It has existed in France
from the time of the middle ages; mention being made of it in the
most ancient commercial records and in the early mercantile regu-
lations of Marseilles and Montpelier. In the vulgar latinity of the
middle ages it was styled commenda, and in Italy accommenda.
In the statutes of Pisa and Florence, it is recognized as far back
as the-year ii6o; also in the ordinance of Louis-le-Hutin, of 1315;
the statutes of Marseilles, 1253; of Geneva of 1588. In the middle
11 Bradf. 35' (N. Y. i85o).
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ages it was one of the most frequent combinations of trade and
was the basis of the active and widely extended commerce of the
opulent maritime cities of Italy. It contributed largely to the sup-
port of the great and prosperous trade carried along the shores
of the Mediterranean, was known in Languedoc, Provence, and
Lombardy, entered into most of the industrial occupations and
pursuits of the age and even travelled under the protection of the
arms of the Crusaders to the City of Jerusalem. At a period when
capital was in the hands of nobles and clergy, who, from pride or
caste, or canonical regulations, could not engage directly in trade,
it afforded the means of secretly embarking in commercial enter-
prises and reaping the profits of such lucrative pursuits without
personal risks, and thus the vast wealth, which otherwise would
have lain dormant in the coffers of the rich, became the founda-
tion by means of -this ingenious idea of that great commerce which
made princes of the merchants, elevated the trading classes and
brought the commons into position as an influential estate of the
commonwealth."
The statement of Judge Bradford indicates the economic and
business conditions which the limited partnership is intended to
meet. In Venice in the middle ages the merchants, under whose
immediate direction the maritime ventures were carried on, were
willing to be liable without limit for the debts incurred in their
prosecution. The noble classes were willing to risk the amount
contributed to the capital of an enterprise in return for a share in
the expected profits. Even had the modern business corporation
been fully developed, as today, there would have been many
cases in which soci6t en commendite or limited partnership
would have been better fitted to the needs of the parties. In the)
limited partnership the limited partner may be sure of the active,
interest of the general partners, who are the directors of the
enterprise, because such partners are, while the directors of aI
corporation are not, liable without limit for the debts. On the
other hand, the general partners secure the additional funds
necessary for the prosecution of the business, and yet remain in
control of the business; while if a corporation is formed, all the
contributors to the capital stock acquire the right to take part
in the management to the extent of a right to vote for the board
of directors.
Again, turning a partnership into a corporation in many
cases involves a loss of credit, because the partners who have up
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to the time of the transformation actually conducted the business,
cease to be liable without limit for the debts.
Of course, there are many incidents of a corporation which
under a great variety of conditions render it a more suitable
business organization than a limited partnership or any other
form of business association. The very fact that all the members
are liable only for the amount contributed to the common fund
makes the corporate form of business organization peculiarly
adapted to large enterprises. In large enterprises the obligations
incurred are large. Few would subscribe to the common fund if,
by so doing, they risked having their entire fortune swept away
if the enterprise was unsuccessful.
The fact, however, that the modern corporation is a busi-
ness association peculiarly adapted to meet many conditions does
not mean that there is no need for other forms of statutory busi-
ness associations. On the contrary, the aim of thelegislatureshould
be to enable business men about to associate for the purpose of
carrying on a business, to choose, among several possible forms of
organization, the one best suited to their special needs. It is a
matter of regret that unlike the business men on the continent of
Europe, or even England, the American business man is, in the
great majority of cases, practically forced today to choose be-
tween only two forms: the common law partnership and the
corporation.
One of the chief reasons why the American business man is
thus limited in organizing a business association to the formation
of a partnership or corporation, is the failure of the limited part-
nership acts to meet the business need for which they were de-
signed.
The Conference on Uniform State Laws in preparing a lim-
ited partnership act had a larger problem to face than merely to
choose the best among the conflicting provisions of existing state
statutes. No existing limited partnership act, and no combina-
tion of the provisions of existing acts would hnake a satisfactory
uniform statute. Existing acts are in more than one respect funda-
mentally defective. A short statement of the nature of these
fundamental defects will show the real nature of the problems
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with which the Conference was obliged to deal, and also serve
to emphasize the fundamental differences between the existing
acts and the new uniform law.
If a person in business by himself or if a partnership desires
to secure additional capital without forming a corporation or
other statutory business association, there are at least three
classes of contracts which can be made with those from whom
the capital is secured. One, the ordinary loan on interest; an-
other, the loan where the lender, in lieu of interest, takes a share
in the profits of the business; and third, those cases in which
the person advancing the capital secures, besides a share in the
profits, some measure of control over the business.
At first, in the absence of statutes, the courts, both in this
country and in England, assumed that one interested in a business
is bound by its obligations, carrying the application of this prin-
ciple so far that a contract, where the only evidence of interest
was a share of the profits, made one who supposed himself a
lender, and who was probably unknown to the creditors at the
times they extended their credits, unlimitedly liable as a partner
to such creditors.2  The influence of cases so holding lasted in
England until the decision in Cox v. Hickman,3 and in this coun-
try in some states until a much later period.4
Later decisions have much modified the earlier cases. The
lender who takes a share in the profits, except possibly in one or
two of our jurisdictions, does not by reason of that fact run the
risk of being held as a partner.5 If, however, his contract falls
within the third class mentioned, and he has any measure of con-
trol over the business, he at once runs serious risk of being held
liable for the debts of the business as a partner, the risk increas-
ing as he increases his control."
'Grace v. Smith, 2 W. Bl. i998 (Eng. 1776) ; Young v. Axtell, 2 H. B1. 235
(Eng. 1793).
'H. L. Cas. 268 (Eng. i86o).
' See Hacket v. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625 (1889).
"On this subject a leading opinion is that of the late judge Doe, of New
Hampshire, in Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1872).
C See specially the opinion of Sir George jessel in Pooley v. Driver, L. R.
5 Ch. Div. 458 (Eng. 1876).
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As stated, the first limited partnership act was adopted by
New York in 1822; the other commercial states, during the ensu-
ing thirty years, followed her example. These statutes were
adopted and to a considerable degree interpreted by the courts
during that period when it was generally held that any interest
in a business made the person holding the interest liable for the
obligations incurred in carrying it on. As a result the courts
usually assumed in the interpretation of these statutes two prin-
ciples as fundamental.
First.-That a limited (or, as he is also called, a special)
partner, is a partner in all respects like any other partner, except
that to obtain the privilege of a limitation of his liability he can
I show that he has exactly conformed to the statutory requirements
in respect to filing a certificate and refrained from participation
in the conduct of the business.
Second.-The limited partner, on any failure to follow tie
requirements in regard to the certificate, or on any participation
in the conduct of his business, loses his privilege of limited lia-
bility, and becomes, as far as those dealing with the business are
concerned, in all respects, a partner.
The courts in thus interpreting the statutes, although they
made an American partnership with limited members something
very different from the French Socijtj en Commendite from
which the idea of the original statutes was derived, unquestion-
ably carried out the intent of those responsible for their adoption.
This is shown by the very wording of the statutes themselves.
For instance, all the statutes require that all partners, limited and
general, shall sign a certificate, and nearly all state that "If any
false statement be made in such certificate all the persons inter-
ested in such partnership shall be liable for all the engagements
thereof as general partners."
The practical result of the spirit shown in the language and
in the interpretation of existing statutes, coupled with the fact
that a man may now lend money to a partnership and take a share
in the profits in lieu of interest without running serious danger
of becoming bound for partnership obligations, has, to a very
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great extent, deprived the existing statutory provisions for lim-
ited partners of any usefulness. Indeed, apparently, their use is
largely confined to associations in which those who conduct the
business have not more than one limited partner; and this for
the obvious reason that while the certificate must state the amount
and character of the contribution of each limited partner, a false
statement by one limited partner, not only makes him a general
partner, but makes all the other limited partners general partners
also, although they had no reason to believe that the statement
of their colleague was untrue.
Again, the fact that no one is hurt by a false statement in
the certificate is immaterial. Being false in fact all the limited
partners become liable as general partners. Thus in the Massa-
chusetts case of Haggerty v. Foster,7 the certificate stated that
Foster had contributed cash to a certain amount, when he had
given to one of the partners an order to sell United States bonds
belonging to him, and then in the custody of a bank, the par
value of the bonds being equal to the amount of cash which the
certificate declared he had contilibuted. These bonds were actually
sold above par and the proceeds acquired by the partnership, so
that instead of the creditors being hurt, they were actually bene-
fited by the variation between the statement in the certificate and
the fact. Nevertheless, the court held Foster liable as a general
partner for all the debts of the partnership, saying:
"It is wholly immaterial that the transaction at the time was
honestly intended and understood by the parties to be sufficient;
that the securities actually transferred afforded the means by which
their cash value was in fact subsequently realized; or that creditors
were not actually defrauded."
A refererence to the Pennsylvania case of Fourth Street
National Bank v. Whitaker,8 will further serve to show why
business men hesitate to take advantage of existing limited part-
nership acts. As in most states, the Pennsylvania Act, which
has just been repealed by the adoption of the new Uniform Act,
contained a section,9 which stated that:
O3 Mass. I7 (I869).
17o Pa. 297 (1895).
'Act of March 21, 1836, P. L. 143, Sec. 12.
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"Every alteration which shall be made in the names of the
parties, in the nature of the business, or in the capital or shares
thereof, or in any matter specified in the original certificate shall
be deemed a dissolution of the partnership, and every such partner-
ship which shall in any manner be carried on after any such altera-
tion shall have been made, shall be deemed a general partnership."
That is, all the limited partners become unlimitedly liable
for all the debts of the partnership, unless the partnership "is re-
newed as a special partnership." To renew as a limited partner-
ship at the-end of the term for which the first limited partnership
has been formed, a new certificate must be filed, and if this new
certificate contains any false statement, no matter how inno-
cently made, all the limited partners become unlimitedly liable.
In the case referred to A, B, C, et al., formed a limited partner-
ship under the Pennsylvania Act of 1836. The original certifi-
cate correctly set forth that A and B were limited partners and
had contributed $ioo,ooo each. At the end of the term for
which the partnership was created the partners desired to renew.
Acting under the supplemental Act of March 30, 1865, "0 they
applied for an appointment of an appraiser of the goods belong-
ing to the partnership, and on his report to the effect that these
were sufficient to pay all the debts of the firm and leave a bal-
ance of more than the original contributions of the limited part-
ners, they filed a renewal certificate, in which they set forth that
the amount of their original contributions remained unimpaired.
There appears to have been no question that in making this state-
ment they were acting in good faith. As a matter of fact, how-
ever, while the property of the partnership was probably more
than $2oo,ooo,-the aggregate of the contributions of the limited
partners,-the debts were more than sufficient to wipe out all
assets, and, therefore, the contributions of the limited partners
were more than impaired; they were lost. A and B, because of
this false statement, were held unlimitedly liable for all the part-
nership debts. The court could hardly have avoided this result in
view of the wording of the act, although the total possible harm
which the unintentional false statement could have possibly done
- P. L 446.
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to the creditors was $200,000. Small wonder that statutes, the
language of which necessitates such decisions, are of little prac-
tical use to individuals or partnerships seeking contributions to
their business capital, and that the acts thus fail to meet the eco-
nomic need which lead to their adoption.
Practically all the differences between the new Uniform Act
and the existing statutes are due to the desire of the Conference to
present to the legislatures of the several states an act, under which
a person willing to invest his money in a business for a share in
the profits, may become a limited partner, with the same sense
of security from any possibility of unlimited liability as the sub-
scribers to the shares of a corporation.
The act proceeds on the assumption that no public policy re-
quires a person who contributes to the capital of a business,
acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree of control over
the conduct of the business, to become bound for the obligations
of the business, provided creditors have no reason to believe at
the times their credits were extended that such person was so
bound. It, therefore, deals in a radically different manner from
former limited partnership acts with the consequences of a false
statement in the certificate.
Section 6 provides that if there is a false statement in the
certificate, one who suffers loss by reliance on such statement
may hold liable any limited partner who knew the statement to
be false when he signed the certificate, or within sufficient time
before the statement was relied on to have had the certificate can-
celled or amended.'1
Again, suppose a person is asked to contribute to the capital
of a business conducted by a person or partnership, and that he
does so, believing he has become a limited partner, but the certifi-
cate required to be filed is not filed, or being filed is so defectivE
that no limited partnership has been formed. Under existing
acts a person in the position described runs a danger of becoming
a general partner, if he takes a share in the profits, and a still
greater danger if he exercises a limited partner's right to look
'I The process of cancelling or amending a certificate is set forth in sec-
tion 25 (3) of the act.
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over the books and give advice to his supposed co-partners. It is'
immaterial that he may have thought all things had been done
necessary for the formation of the limited partnership, and also
that the persons doing business with the partnership may at the
time they extended credit believe he was a limited partner. Sec-
tion :ii of the Uniform Act meets this situation by providing
that a person who has contributed to the capital of a business
conducted by a person or partnership, erroneously believing that
he has become a limited partner in a limited partnership, is not,
by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited partner, a gen-
eral partner with the person or in the partnership carrying on the
business; provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly
renounces his interest in the profits of the business or other com-
pensation by way of income.
Under existing acts a limited partner is in effect a general
partner securing limited liability by complying with the requisites
stated in the act. In the Uniform Act the person who contributes
the capital, though in accordance with custom called a limited
partner, is not in any sense a partner; he is a member of an asso-
ciation having two classes of members, the general partners, and
the contributors called limited partners.
As limited partners are not partners securing limited liability
by filing a certificate, every detail of which must be complied
with, the association is formed when substantial compliance in
good faith is had with the requirements for a certificate.
12
Under existing acts the question whether a limited partner
having paid his contribution in full, and, thereafter, loaning
money to the partnership shall be treated in respect to such loan
as a partner making an advance or as an ordinary creditor, has
been the subject of conflicting decisions,13 although logically un-
der the theory that a limited partner is in all respects a partner,
except that his liability is limited, it follows that for further ad-
" Sec. 2 (2).
1
2In White v. Hackett, 2o N. Y. x78 (1859), and Downing's App., 44 Pa.
150 (1863), also Jaffe v. Crum, 88 Mo. 669 (1886), the limited partner was
treated as a partner in respect to such further advance. Clapp v. Tracy, 35
Conn. 463 (1863), contra.
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vances beyond his contributions he should be treated as a part-
ner and postponed to the other creditors. Under the Uniform
Act, however, a limited partner, not being in any sense a partner.
is not debarred from loaning money or transacting other busi-
ness with the partnership as any other non-member; provided he
does not, in respect to such transaction, accept from the partner-
ship collateral security, or receive from any partner or the part-
nership any payment, conveyance or release from liability, if at
the time the assets of the partnership are not sufficient to dis-
charge its obligations to persons not general or limited partners.14
So, also, as limited partners are not in the Uniform Act prin-
cipals in partnership transactions. Their liability, except for
known false statements in the certificate,15 is to the partnership,
not to the creditors of the partnership. 6 The general partners
cannot, however, waive any liability of the limited partners to
the prejudice of such creditors.
17
Perhaps that section of the act which will have as great
practical effect as any in inducing small partnerships desiring addi-
tional capital to form a limited partnership under the act, rather
than a corporation, is section 13, which permits a person to be a
general partner and a special partner at the same time. This
provision enables the partners to divide the entire capital of the
partnership into shares, and themselves subscribe to the partner-
ship fund on the same basis in respect to a share in the profits
and as to capital in case of dissolution as outside contributors. A
person who is a general, and also at t!he same time a limited
partner, has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the
liabilities of a general partner, except that, in respect to his con-
tribution, he has the rights against the other members which he
would have had if he were not also a general partner. If, there-
fore, A, B and C are limited partners, A and B being also gen-
eral partners, on the winding up of the partnership after the pay-
ment of all debts due outsiders, the remaining assets, would be
"' Sec. 13.
' Sec. 7.
" Sec. 17.
" Sec. 17 (3).
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used first to pay back pro rata the contributions of A, B and C as
limited partners.
Other sections of minor, but nevertheless of considerable
importance deserve notice.
Section 9 makes clear the rights and powers of a general
partner, a matter which existing acts fail to touch. The Uni-
form Act declares that a general partner shall have all the rights
and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of
a partner in a partnership without limited partners, except that
without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by
all the limited partners, a general partner or all of the general
partners have no authority to
"(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate.
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on
the ordinary business of the partnership.
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership.
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in
specific partnership property, for other than a partnership purpose.
(e) Admit a person as general partner.
(f) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right so
to do is given in the certificate.
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the
death, retirement or insanity of a general partner, unless the right
so to do is given in the certificate."
Section IO deals with the rights of a limited partner; pro-
viding that he shall have the right to receive the share in the
profits stipulated for in the certificate,' and a return of his con-
tribution after all liabilities of the partnership to persons not gen-
eral or limited partners have been paid.19 It also declares that a
limited partner shall have the same rights as a general partner to
"(a) Have the partnership books kept at the principal place
of business of the partnership, and at all times to inspect and copy
any of them.
(b) Have on demand true and full information of all things
affecting the partnership, and a formal account of partnership af-
fairs whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable, and
(c) Have dissolution and winding-up by decree of court."
Perhaps the detail with which the Uniform Act covers sub-
'* Sec. r5.
"Sec. T6.
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jects of practical importance which are only dealt with in a gen-
eral way by existing acts, is best shown by the different methods
employed in treating the subject of assignment of a limited part-
ner's interest. In the original limited partnership acts this sub-
ject was treated logically under the theory that a limited partner
was in all respects except as to his liability a partner. Thus, an
attempted assignment of his interest by a limited partner was as
effective to produce a dissolution of the partnership as an assign-
ment by a general partner of his interest. By supplemental or
amending acts, however, limited partners were permitted to as-
sign. The Pennsylvania statute on the subject, the Act of April
16,1858,20 one of the acts specifically repealed by the recent act
putting in force the Uniform Act, is typical. It provides that a
limited (special) partner, with the assent of his partners, in writ-
ing, first had and obtained, may sell or assign his interest in a
limited partnership without causing thereby a dissolution of the
partnership. The treatment of the subject in section 19 of the
Uniform Act is as follows:
"(I) A limited partner's interest is assignable.
(2) A substituted limited partner is a partner admitted to all
the rights of a limited partner who has died or has assigned his
interest in the partnership.
(3) An assignee, who does not become a substituted limited
partner, has no right to require any information or account of the
partnership transactions or to inspect the partnership books; he is'
only entitled to receive the share of the profits or other compensa-
tion by way of income, or the return of his contribution to which
his assignor would otherwise be entitled.
(4) An assignee shall have the right to become a substituted
limited partner if all the members (except the assignor) consent
thereto, or if the assignor, being thereunto empowered by the cer-
tificate, gives the assignee that right.
(5) An assignee becomes a substituted limited partner when
the certificate is appropriately amended in accordance with Sec-
tion 25.
(6) The substituted limited partner has all the rights and
powers, and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of his
assignor, except those liabilities of which he was ignorant at the
time he became a limited partner and which could not be ascer-
tained from the certificate.
' P. L. 68, 69i.
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(7) The substitution of the assignee as a limited partner does
not release the assignor from liability to the partnership under Sec-
tions 6 and U7."
Section 22 adopts the same procedure to subject the interest
of the limited partner in the partnership to the payment of his
separate creditors as is adopted in the Uniform Partnership Act
to subject the interest of the partner to the payment of his sepa-
rate debts.2 1 Section 22 provides:
"On due application to a court of competent jurisdiction by
any judgment creditor of a limited partner, the court may charge
the interest of the indebted limited partner with payment of the
unsatisfied amount of the judgment debt; and may appoint a re-
ceiver, and make all other orders, directions, and inquiries which
the circumstances of the case may require."
In those states where a creditor on beginning an action can
attach debts due the defendant before he has obtained a judgment
against the defendant, the commissioners recommended that
paragraph i of this section read as follows:
"On due application to a court of competent jurisdiction by
any creditor of a limited partner, the court may charge the interest
of the indebted limited partner with payment of the unsatisfied
amount of such claim; and may appoint a receiver and make all
other orders, directions and inquiries which the circumstances of
the case may require."
Among the pitfalls for the unwary limited partner under
prior acts, are the provisions for renewal certificates, if it is de-
sired to continue the limited partnership after the time originally
stated in the certificate for its termination. Thus section ii of
the Pennsylvania Act of 1836 provided as the statutes of the
great majority of the states still provide, that
"Every renewal or continuance of such partnership beyond
the time originally fixed for its duration shall be certified, acknowl-
edged and recorded, and an affidavit of a general partner be made
and filed, and notice be given in the manner herein required for
its original formation, and every such partnership which shall be
otherwise renewed and continued shall be deemed a general part-
nership."
The unfortunate consequences of any false statement in a
' See section 28 of the Uniform Partnership Act.
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renewal certificate, though innocently made, has been shown. In
the Uniform Act, the limited partner is fully protected from being
caught in the trap of unlimited liability, and at the same time,
the provisions for amending and cancelling a certificate
are set forth in an administrative detail not found in the more
or less vague language of existing acts. Sections 24 and 25 of
the Uniform Act deal with the question of when the certificate
shall be cancelled or amended, 22 and the requisites for cancella-
tion and amendment. 23  If any statement in the original certifi-
cate has ceased to be true the certificate contains a false state-
ment. Any limited partner knowing the statement to be false
within a sufficient time before the statement was relied upon to
enable him to cancel or amend the certificate under the provisions
of section 25, is, as previously explained, under section 6 liable
to one who suffers loss by reliance on such statement. Knowing
that the certificate contains by reason of changed circumstances,
a false statement, it is his duty to see that the certificate is
amended to correspond with present facts. But under section
25 (I) a writing to cancel or amend a certificate must be sworn
to by all the partners, general and limited. Paragraphs 3 and 4,
therefore of this section provide that a person desiring the can-
cellatioi= or amendment of a certificate, if any of the other lim-
ited or general partners refuse to join him in signing the required
writing, may file in the proper court a petition, for an order of
cancellation or amendment. The certificate is actually amended
or cancelled, as the case may be, when there is filed for record
the proper writing duly signed, or a certified copy of the order
which the court has made in respect to the petition.
Under section 30 of the Uniform Act any existing limited
partnership formed under any statute of the state prior to the
adoption of the act, may become a limited partnership under the
Uniform Act; or, if its members prefer, they can continue to be
governed by the provisions of the act under which their- limited
partnership was formed until the expiration of the term; and
' Sec. 24.
= Sec. 25.
730 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
even at the expiration of the term, they may renew under the
provisions of the act under which their partnership was formed,
provided the original partnership articles contained a clause of
renewal.
In Pennsylvania the adoption of the Uniform Act was com-
plicated by the fact that there were two acts in the state under
which limited partnerships could be formed. The act under
which practically all the limited partnerships in the state were
organized was the Act of March 31, 1836, its amendments and
supplements; which act, as has already been pointed out, was
practically identical with nearly all other limited partnership acts
throughout the United States. There was also the Act of May
9, 1899,24 which provided for the formation of two kinds of busi-
ness associations: a joint stock association, that is, one in which
the liability of all the members is limited to the amounts con-
tributed to the common stock, and the other a true limited part-
nership, that is, an association in which the liability of some,
but not all, of the members was limited to their contributions to
the common stock. The Commissioners on Uniform Laws not
only recommended the adoption of the Uniform Act, but the re-
peal of all other acts under which a limited partnership may be
formed. In Pennsylvania, therefore, in order to carry out this
recommendation, it was necessary to pass two acts: one, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, containing a section specifi-
cally repealing the Act of March 21, 1836, and its numerous
amendments and supplements; the other, an act amending the
Act of 1899 in such a way as to confine hereafter its scope to the
organization of business associations in which the liability of all
the members is limited. In each act specific provisions had to be
made for existing partnerships formed under the act repealed and
amended.
These details are mentioned not only because they have
practical interest in a state which has recently enacted the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act, but also because they illustrate
the fact that those locally interested in the adoption of uniform
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acts are often confronted with problems of no little difficulty in
preparing the act for adoption by their state legislature. Add to
this that the work of looking after the passage of any act through
the legislature requires the exercise of tact, also often involves
the expenditure of much time, and that the commissioners serve
without pay, and it is only a matter of wonder that these com-
mercial acts have been adopted to as great an extent as they
have. While it is true that in some states the commissioners
have failed to secure the adoption of more than one or two of
their commercial. acts, in others a considerable proportion have
already become law, while in such states as Maryland, Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania, where the commissioners have shown
extraordinary diligence, practically all-in Pennsylvania all-the
uniform commercial acts are already part of the law of the state.
William Draper Lewis.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
